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PAY OR PLAY?: WHY REQUIRING NOTICE 
AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE IN 
CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES BEST 
SERVES THE COMPLIANCE GOALS OF 
TITLE IX 
JULIE G. YAP* 
In 2011, the University of Delaware eliminated its varsity men’s outdoor 
track and field team after 100 years of intercollegiate competition.1  The 
university cited “exercising fiscal responsibility and remaining in compliance 
with Title IX” as the reasons for the cut.2  However, the university did not 
argue that the elimination was essential to immediate compliance with the 
law.3  Indeed, the university had been maintaining compliance through the 
periodic expansion of female athletic programs and planned to add a women’s 
golf team in the fall of 2011.4  Rather, the team was eliminated out of the 
university’s concern that it could not remain compliant in the future given 
financial constraints.5  In eliminating a more low-profile team, the university 
joined dozens of fellow institutions that have eliminated men’s “minor” sports 
teams, such as wrestling,6 tennis, and gymnastics, purportedly because of Title 
 
* Julie Yap is a lawyer in Washington, D.C.  She served as a career law clerk in the Eastern 
District of California and as an adjunct professor at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of 
Law.  Special thanks to Scott P. Mallery for his continual comments and insight and to the Honorable 
Frank C. Damrell, Jr. (ret.) for his thoughtful review and amazing mentorship. 
1. Katie Thomas, Cutting Men’s Programs Now to Satisfy Title IX in Future, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 
2011, at D1; Kevin Tresolini, University of Delaware Drops Men’s Track, Cross Country, 
DELAWARE ONLINE (Jan. 19, 2011), http://blogs.delawareonline.com/collegesports/2011/01/19/ 
university-of-delaware-drops-mens-track-cross-country.  
2. Tresolini, supra note 1.  The university also eliminated men’s cross country.  Id. 
3. Thomas, supra note 1. 
4. Id.; Tresolini, supra note 1.  In 1991, the university had eliminated men’s wrestling, and 
subsequently added women’s soccer and women’s rowing.  Tresolini, supra note 1. 
5. Thomas, supra note 1.  The university’s athletic director stated, “Continued expansion of our 
athletic program is not feasible in this financial climate, and given that reality, the university made the 
only decision it could.”  Id.; Laura Gottesdiener, University of Delaware’s Title IX Sports Cuts:  
Questions Still Linger, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05 
/09/university-delaware-title-ix_n_859737.html. 
6. In January 2002, the National Wrestling Coaches Association and others brought suit against 
the Department of Education, claiming that Title IX results in discrimination against men because it 
forces schools to cut men’s teams, such as wrestling.  See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. 
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IX. 7 
However, critics of the decision, including members of the former track 
and field team, question whether Title IX is unnecessarily taking the blame for 
the elimination of the programs.8  Specifically, concerns have been raised that 
Title IX has become the scapegoat for funneling additional resources into the 
football budget.9  In fact, similar cuts to lower profile varsity men’s programs 
have been made at other schools in the Colonial Athletic Conference, in which 
the university competes; Towson University cut four men’s teams in 2004, and 
James Madison University cut seven in 2006.10  Further, advocates of Title IX 
assert that the law is often unfairly blamed for the misallocation of resources 
to “major” men’s sports, such as football and basketball.11 
 
Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2003).  However, in the four-year period when the three-
part test was not enforced, 1984–1988, “colleges and universities cut wrestling teams at a rate almost 
three times as high as the rate of decline during the twelve years after Title IX’s application to 
intercollegiate athletics was firmly reestablished.”  Jocelyn Samuels & Kristen Galles, In Defense of 
Title IX:  Why Current Policies Are Required to Ensure Equality of Opportunity, 14 MARQ. SPORTS 
L. REV. 11, 32 (2003).   
7. Chelsea A. Young, Experts Reflect on Title IX’s Successes, Challenges 35 Years After Law 
Enacted, STANFORD REP. (May 2, 2007), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/may2/title-
050207.html; Megan K. Starace, Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX:  Do Men Have a Sporting 
Chance?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 189, 190 (2001) (noting that the indirect result of Title IX is 
that “budget restrictions force universities to reduce the number of roster spots available on men’s 
athletic teams or, in the alternative, eliminate these teams completely”); Susan M. Shook, The Title IX 
Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990’s: Nonrevenue Men’s Teams Join Women 
Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L. J. 773, 793–96 (1996) (“[I]nstitutions facing budget 
cuts realize that while downsizing their athletic programs is an economic must, they cannot respond 
by lowering the participation opportunities granted to female athletes. As a result, some schools have 
responded by retaining most, if not all, of their women’s varsity sports slots while cutting back on 
their men’s teams.”); see Dennis Dodd, Football Needs to Start Making Title IX Sacrifices, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (June 12, 2002), http://www.cbssports.com/b/page/pressbox/0,1328,5427007, 
00.html (noting that hundreds of men’s programs have been cut in order to free up scholarships for 
new women’s programs). 
8. Gottesdiener, supra note 5. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Numerous Title IX experts and commentators posit that the problem is not that Title IX takes 
resources away from men’s sports, but that resources are misallocated among men’s sports with the 
majority of resources distributed to men’s football and basketball teams.  Title IX and Men’s “Minor” 
Sports: A False Conflict, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER (July 2008), at 1, available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Men’s%20Minor%20Sports%20Final.pdf [hereinafter 
Title IX and Men’s “Minor” Sports]; see also Dodd, supra note 7 (noting that none of the 117 I-A 
programs have cut a single football scholarship in order to gain compliance with Title IX); Graham 
Watson, Title IX Puts Schools in Conundrum, ESPN (July 14, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com 
/ncaa/news/story?id=4326021 (noting that 75–78% of Division I men’s athletic budget is spent on 
men’s basketball and football).  However, critics of Title IX point to the revenue generating disparity 
between men’s and women’s athletic programs.  Id.  In the 2007–2008 academic year, the median 
NCAA Division I men’s program generated $22.2 million in revenue, $19.6 million of which was 
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At the core of this controversy is one thing.  Money. 
Title IX was landmark legislation that changed the educational and athletic 
opportunities available to women.12  Its purposes were considered 
revolutionary at the time it was enacted and continue to serve a vital service in 
educational equality among men and women to this day.13  In a world of 
limitless resources, no one would seriously debate the importance of providing 
gender equity to women in the provision of athletic opportunities. 
However, this is not a world of limitless resources. 
The debate over Title IX is driven by the allocation of finite athletic 
department budgets.  It requires tough choices between men’s programs that 
have been around for decades (or even a century),14 programs that produce 
thousands (if not millions) in revenue,15 and programs that give a class of 
historically underrepresented students an opportunity to compete.  Critics of 
Title IX assert that the former should not necessarily be sacrificed by the 
latter.16 
 
attributable to men’s football and basketball, while the median women’s program generated 
$865,000.  Id.   
12. In 1974, nationwide, 50,000 men attended college on athletic scholarships, compared to 
fewer than 50 women.  Twenty-five years later, well over 100,000 women participated in varsity 
sports at member institutions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).  Lee Sigelman 
& Paul J. Wahlbeck, Gender Proportionality in Intercollegiate Athletics:  The Mathematics of Title IX 
Compliance, 80 SOC. SCI. Q. 518, 519 (1999) (citing Hearing on Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 Before the H. Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ., Training, and Life-Long 
Learning of the H. Comm. on Economic and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong., 104–31, 138–77 
(1995) (statement by Normal Cantu, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civ. Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.). 
13. Moreover, the work of Title IX is far from over.  At the thirty-year anniversary of the 
enactment of Title IX, women’s athletic programs continued to lag behind men’s athletic programs in 
participation opportunities, athletic scholarships, operating budgets, and recruiting expenditures.  Title 
IX and Men’s “Minor” Sports: A False Conflict, supra note 11, at 1.  “For example, women in 
Division I colleges, while representing 53% of the student body, receive only 44% of the participation 
opportunities, 37% of the total money spent on athletics, 45% of the total athletic scholarship dollars, 
and 32% of recruiting dollars.”  Id. (citing NCAA, 2003–04 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT 
(September 2006), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/GERONLINE. 
pdf). 
14. See Thomas, supra note 1. 
15. See Gottesdiener, supra note 5 (noting that, in 2010, the University of Delaware’s football 
team netted just under one million dollars). 
16. Some legal and policy scholars have called for the repeal or, at minimum, reworking of Title 
IX based on, inter alia, the law’s failure to take into account the costs of providing particular athletic 
opportunities, the revenue generated by certain sports, and the inflexible proportionality requirement.  
Richard A. Epstein, Repeal Title IX, DEFINING IDEAS (May 4, 2011), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/77231 (“Congress should junk Title IX in 
its entirety as a failed experiment in government intervention.”); see also Allison Kasic, Title IX and 
Athletics: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives and Unintended Consequences, INDEP. WOMEN’S 
FORUM, June 2010, at 9, available at http://www.iwf.org/files/8fc3dc20d277ff96968266aaab0add0a. 
pdf (“[T]he development and current enforcement of Title IX policies have succeeded only in 
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But, what if these already limited budgets were further depleted in the 
name of Title IX?  What if female students, some of whom may have the 
desire but not the ability to compete at a collegiate varsity level, were given a 
payout for a school’s unanticipated or unintentional failure to comply with 
Title IX?  What if those female students do not even attend the institution 
anymore?  What if these female students bring suit in the form of a class 
action that eventually results in damages that exceed an entire athletic 
department’s budget?  How will advocates of Title IX defend such a result?  
Litigation surrounding the effective accommodation of athletic 
opportunities for women has been sparse, and most has involved claims for 
injunctive relief, seeking the actual addition of more athletic opportunities for 
women at the collegiate level.  Recently, though, a split among circuits has 
emerged with respect to claims for money damages arising out of the alleged 
ineffective accommodation of female student-athletes.  While one circuit has 
concluded that an institution must be given notice and an opportunity to cure 
this type of alleged violation,17 two circuits have concluded that because 
institutional decisions regarding athletic programs are always intentional, 
notice and an opportunity to cure are not required.18  
This article asserts that, where money damages are sought: (1) notice and 
an opportunity to cure alleged claims of ineffective accommodation is 
consistent with the statutory scheme enacted by Congress; and (2) failure to 
require such notice ignores precedent relating to the appropriate interpretation 
of legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’ authority under the Spending 
Clause.  Moreover, failure to require notice and an opportunity to cure in 
claims for money damages undermines the flexible application and even-
handed enforcement mechanisms of the statute.  Finally, allowing individuals 
to sue for money damages without notice and an opportunity to cure may 
likely lead to further criticism of the statute, particularly in times of fiscal 
distress for many educational institutions.19   
 
replacing one form of discrimination with another.”); Neal McCluskey, UConn’s Streak and Title IX, 
CATO INST. (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/uconns-streak-and-title-ix/ (arguing that 
Title IX does not reflect “the reality . . . that women might just not want to play sports as fervently as 
men”).  Moreover, the American Sports Council, previously the College Sports Council, recently filed 
suit against the Department of Education, alleging that the use of gender quotas to enforce Title IX in 
high school athletic programs violates the Equal Protection Clause.  Complaint, Am. Sports Council 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-1347, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41233 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2012).  
17. Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272 F.3d 568, 569 (8th Cir. 2001). 
18. Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 602 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).  
19. Watson, supra note 11 (noting that maintaining gender equity and Title IX compliance in 
both athletic opportunities and scholarships has become even more difficult during the economic 
downturn). 
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Conversely, such notice is not needed when a party brings suit to actually 
end or prevent a discriminatory practice or policy, because a suit purely for 
injunctive and declaratory relief does not implicate the countervailing policy 
concern of ensuring that funds are optimally devoted to the provision of equal 
educational and athletic opportunities.  Indeed, unlike suits for money 
damages, suits for equitable relief further the primary focus of Title IX—
protecting individuals from discriminatory practices.20 
Part I describes the evolution of the private right of action under Title IX, 
including the Spending Clause principles that influence its statutory 
interpretation and the scope of the rights and remedies available.  Part II 
examines the current split among the circuits regarding whether notice and an 
opportunity to cure is required in suits for money damages arising out of 
challenges to an institution’s athletic program.  Part III proposes that notice 
and an opportunity to cure is required in such cases in order to comply with 
both statutory interpretation and sound policy.  
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX FOR 
MONEY DAMAGES 
Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
provides: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .21 
“Congress enacted Title IX in response to its finding—after extensive 
hearings held in 1970 by the House Special Subcommittee on Education—of 
pervasive discrimination against women with respect to educational 
opportunities.”22  In enacting Title IX, Congress “sought to accomplish two 
 
20. This Article does not advocate for the imposition of a notice and opportunity to cure 
requirement when a party brings suit to actually end or prevent a discriminatory practice or policy.  
Furthermore, this Article does not advocate for restrictions on whom is an appropriate person to give 
notice or what type of notice is required.  The Article simply asserts that some actual notice and 
opportunity to cure should be required before allowing a plaintiff to sue for money damages under 
Title IX.   
21. Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2011). 
22. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir.1996) [hereinafter Cohen II].  Title IX 
addressed a perceived gap created by Title VI, which prohibits race discrimination by institutions that 
receive federal funding, and Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment on a variety of 
bases, including sex.  David S. Cohen, Limiting Gebser: Institutional Liability for Non-Harassment 
Sex Discrimination Under Title IX, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 311, 317–18 (2004).  Neither Title VI 
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related, but nevertheless somewhat different, objectives.”23  Specifically, 
Congress sought “to avoid the use of federal resources to support 
discriminatory practices” and “to provide individual citizens effective 
protection against those practices.”24  Title IX anticipated institutional 
compliance by 1978.25   
Title IX’s coverage extends, with few exceptions, to educational 
institutions—including colleges, universities, elementary and secondary 
institutions, and training programs—that receive federal funding.26  Because 
federal financial assistance takes many forms, both direct and indirect,27 “in 
practice, [Title IX reaches] the vast majority of accredited colleges and 
universities.”28  Where Title IX applies, it guarantees equal opportunity in all 
aspects of the education program, including admissions, treatment of 
participants, and employment.29 
A. Evolution of Title IX and Implementing Regulations 
After Title IX was first enacted in 1972, the breadth of Title IX’s 
application was unclear, particularly with regard to whether the statute’s 
requirements applied to athletic programs.30  Indeed, the inclusion of athletic 
programs generally, and football specifically, was debated prior to enactment.  
Attempts by Congress to exclude “revenue producing” sports, such as football, 
were defeated or otherwise died in committee.31   
In 1974, Congress sought to resolve the lack of clarity by directing the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to draft implementing 
 
nor Title VII, however, prohibits sex discrimination in education.  Id. at 318. 
23. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). 
24. Id. 
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2). 
26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL (2001), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/crt/about/cor/coord/ixlegal.php. 
27. The Supreme Court has expressly held that “[t]here is no basis in the statute for the view that 
only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid or receive checks directly from the federal 
government are subject to regulation.”  Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984).  “The 
economic effect of direct and indirect assistance is often indistinguishable.”  Id. at 565. 
28. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Cohen I].  The most 
common funding sources for colleges and universities are federal student loans, federal work-study 
dollars, and federal research grants.  Janet P. Judge, Title IX and Its Application to Intercollegiate 
Athletics, in PRACTICAL INSIGHT ON NATIONAL ISSUES IMPACTING HIGHER EDUCATION § 11.2 
(Robert W. Iuliano ed., 2009); see generally Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 563–69. 
29. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 26. 
30. Judge, supra note 28, § 11.1. 
31. Id. 
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regulations that included direction to intercollegiate athletic programs.32  In 
1975, the HEW33 issued its first set of implementing regulations to Title IX.34  
The regulations generally provide: 
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated 
differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated 
against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or 
intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient 
shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.35 
With respect to intercollegiate athletics, the regulations more specifically 
provide that “[a] recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, 
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic 
opportunity for members of both sexes.”36  This provision guarantees equality 
in both the provision of athletic opportunities—”effective accommodation”—
and the treatment as student-athletes37—”equal treatment.”38  The effective 
accommodation component is set forth in 34 C.F.R. section 106.41(c); it 
requires consideration of “[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of 
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of 
 
32. Id. 
33. In 1979, the HEW was divided into the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
and the Department of Education (DOE).  Dep’t of Educ. Org. Act, Pub. L. No 96-88 (1979).  The 
DOE, acting through the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is the current agency responsible for 
administering and ensuring compliance with Title IX.  When the HEW was divided into the HHS and 
the DOE, “the existing regulations were left within HHS’s arsenal while, at the same time, [DOE] 
replicated them as part of its own regulatory armamentarium.”  Cohen I, 99 F.2d at 895.  For purposes 
of clarity, the article cites only to the DOE regulations, found at 34 C.F.R. § 106.   
34. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895. 
35. Athletics, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2011). 
36. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). 
37. Equal treatment of student-athletes requires that educational institutions (1) “allocate athletic 
scholarship dollars equitably;” and (2) “treat male and female students equitably in all respects of 
athletics, including with regard to equipment and supplies; locker rooms, facilities, and practice areas; 
scheduling of games and practices; medical and training services; publicity; and assignment and 
compensation of coaches.”  Samuels & Galles, supra note 6, at 13.  While this Article discusses only 
the first component—equal athletic participation opportunities—the same principles apply with 
almost equal force to claims brought for a violation of the equal treatment components of Title IX.  
Accordingly, while this Article does not expressly address such claims, as set forth, infra, notice and 
an opportunity to cure should similarly be a prerequisite to suits for money damages brought under an 
equal treatment theory. 
38. Id.  While these prohibitions bear equal weight in determining whether an institution is Title 
IX compliant, “in practice, participation opportunities are primus inter pares in deciding whether a 
school is compliant with Title IX.”  Sigelman & Wahlbeck, supra note 12, at 520. 
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both sexes.”39  At its core, the effective accommodation component is 
concerned with the availability of equal opportunities for female student-
athletes to participate in athletics. 
With respect to measuring effective accommodation, Title IX expressly 
provides that statistical evidence of an imbalance between the percentage of 
persons of a certain sex at an institution receiving federal funds and the 
percentage of persons of that sex in any community by itself is insufficient “to 
require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment 
to the members of one sex.”40  However, such an imbalance can be considered 
in evaluating whether equal accommodation has been provided.41 
As a result of the ambiguity in how to consider proportional imbalances 
and “in response to numerous complaints alleging Title IX violations with 
regard to discrimination in athletics,” in 1979 “the HEW issued a policy 
interpretation explaining the ways in which institutions may effectively 
accommodate the interests and abilities of their student-athletes.”42  The 
policy interpretation (1979 Interpretation) sets forth the “three-part test” for 
measuring compliance with Title IX.43  Under this test, a university may 
demonstrate compliance in one of three ways: by showing that (1) 
“intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students 
are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective 
enrollments”;44 or (2) the institution has “a history and continuing practice of 
 
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1).  The equal treatment component derives from 34 C.F.R. § 
106.41(c)(2)–(10), which requires equality in (1) provision of equipment and supplies, (2) scheduling 
of games and practice time, (3) travel and per diem allowance, (4) opportunities to receive coaching 
and academic tutoring, (5) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors, (6) provision of 
locker rooms, practice, and competitive facilities, (7) provision of medical and training facilities and 
services, (8) provision of housing and dining facilities and services, and (8) publicity. 
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 
41. Id. 
42. Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:03-cv-2591, 2011 WL 3364887, at *45 
(E.D. Cal., Aug. 3, 2011); A Policy Interpretation, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, OFFICE FOR 
CIV. RIGHTS, DEP’T OF EDUC., 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html (hereinafter 1979 Policy Interpretation].  
The 1979 Interpretation delineates three general areas in which institutional compliance with the 
effective accommodation section of the regulation is assessed” – (1) the determination of athletic 
interests and abilities of students; (2) the selection of sports offered; and (3) the levels of competition 
available including the opportunity for team competition.  Id.; Roberts v. Colo. St. Bd. of Agric., 998 
F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993).   
43. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42.  The 1979 Interpretation was effective on its face 
December 11, 1979.  However, it was never submitted to the President for approval, and thus, does 
not have the binding effect of rule, regulations, or orders authorized by 20 U.S.C. § 1682.  See 
Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996) rev’d on other grounds, 213 F.3d 858 
(5th Cir. 2000). 
44. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42.  The first prong of the three-part test “effectively 
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program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing 
interest and abilities of the members” of the historically underrepresented 
sex;45 or (3) “the interests and abilities of the members of [the historically 
underrepresented sex]46 have been fully and effectively accommodated47 by 
the present program.”48 
However, between 1984 and 1988, institutions once again faced 
uncertainty regarding whether Title IX required equal opportunities in athletic 
programs.  In 1984, in Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court held that 
Title IX’s compliance requirements were program specific.49  The fact that 
federal funds might eventually reach an institution’s general operating budget 
could not subject the entire institution to Title IX’s requirement; rather the 
“program or activity” that received federal assistance is the only “program or 
activity” regulated under Title IX.50   
 
provides that if every female student has the same chances of participating in athletics as every male 
student, then the school will be found to be providing equal athletic participation opportunities.”  
Samuels & Galles, supra note 6, at 15. 
45. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42.  The second prong of the three-part test focuses on 
incremental progress toward equality, “an exceptionally and atypically generous standard for 
measuring civil rights compliance.”  Id. 
46. While the regulations refer generally to the “historically underrepresented sex,” this Article 
refers specifically to women and female student-athletes as the intended beneficiaries of Title IX’s 
protections.  The author is aware of no cases challenging an educational institution’s athletic program 
under Title IX on the basis that male students are not offered substantially proportionate athletic 
opportunities relative to their enrollment. 
47. The third prong of the three-part test is satisfied if female students are not interested in 
additional opportunities to participate in athletics.  “In practice, the third prong often constitutes a 
significant ‘chicken and egg’ barrier for female athletes” due to a history of barriers, social and 
institutional, that impeded female interest, ability, and participation.  Samuel & Galles, supra note 6, 
at 15–16.  “Fundamentally, the problem with an interest-based test for allocation of participation 
opportunities lies in the fact that women’s lower rate of participation in athletics reflects women’s 
historical lack of opportunities to participate in sports—not lack of interest, which evolves as a 
function of opportunity and experience.”  Id. at 29 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
48. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42.  “Critics insist, and many defenders concede, that 
the real issue is proportionality, not program expansion or full accommodation.”  Sigelman & 
Wahlbeck, supra note 12, at 521.  While proportionality is only one means of demonstrating 
compliance with Title IX, “compliance in the foreseeable future with either the second or third prong 
of the participation requirement is widely dismissed as a pipe dream” because cost cutting, as opposed 
to program expansion, has been the trend.  Id.  Many critics assert that proportionality is not a fair or 
accurate measurement for gender equality in intercollegiate activity.  Id. 
49. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 571–74. 
50. Id.  In Grove City College, the petitioner was a private, coeducational, liberal arts college that 
consistently refused both state and federal financial assistance in order to preserve its institutional 
autonomy.  Id. at 559.  However, the institution enrolled a large number of students who received 
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) pursuant to the DOE’s Alternate Disbursement 
System.  Id.  As a result, the DOE concluded that the college was a “recipient” of “Federal financial 
assistance” under Title IX and requested that the college execute an “Assurance of Compliance” 
required under the applicable regulations.  Id. at 560.  Despite rejecting the petitioner’s argument that 
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In response, in 1988, Congress reinstated an institution-wide application 
of Title IX by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.51  Under the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act, if any facet of an educational institution receives 
federal funds, the entire institution must comply with Title IX’s 
requirements.52  In an attempt to better monitor, and thus, ensure such 
compliance, 53 in 1994, Congress passed the Equity in Athletics Disclosure 
Act (EADA), which imposes an annual reporting requirement for colleges and 
universities that have separate athletic programs for men and women.54  The 
statute requires federally funded higher education institutions to disclose (1) 
the number of undergraduates and athletes, divided by gender; (2) certain 
financial information regarding athletic departments, including the money 
spent on athletic scholarships; (3) graduation rate of student-athletes broken 
down by race and gender; and (4) the gender of coaches.55   
Subsequently, in 1996, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) published a 
clarification (the “1996 Clarification”) of the three-part test for effective 
accommodation.  The 1996 Clarification was preceded by a letter from Norma 
V. Cantu, the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, which emphasized the case 
specific nature of the Title IX analysis for effective accommodation claims.56  
Specifically, Cantu noted, “the Clarification does not provide strict numerical 
formulas or ‘cookie cutter’ answers to the issues that are inherently case- and 
fact-specific.”57  Cantu further explained that “Title IX provides institutions 
with flexibility and choice regarding how they will provide nondiscriminatory 
 
it was not required to comply with Title IX because it did not directly receive financial assistance, the 
Court held that the college was only required to comply with Title IX in the administration of its 
student financial aid program because that was the program receiving indirect federal financial 
assistance through the BEOGs.  Id. at 574–75.  In so holding, the Court rejected arguments that the 
entire institution could be subject to Title IX requirements simply because (1) federal assistance in 
one area may allow diversion of funds to other areas, or (2) federal assistance could potentially be 
used to provide a variety of services to the students through whom the funds pass.  Id. at 573. 
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687; Civ. Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L 100-259 § 2 (1988). 
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1687.  The Act provides, in relevant part, “For purposes of this chapter, the term 
‘program or activity’ and ‘program’ mean all the operation of . . . a college, university, or other 
postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education, . . . any part of which is extended 
Heckman Federal financial assistance.”  Id. 
53. See Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender Equity 
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 MO. L. REV. 329, 371–72 (1996). 
54. Cleary Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2011). 
55. Id.; Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968; Diane Heckman, Is Notice Required in a Title IX Athletics 
Action Not Involving Sexual Harassment?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175, 214–15 (2003). 
56. Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics 
Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 16, 
1996), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html [hereinafter 1996 
Clarification]. 
57. Id. 
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participation opportunities” and that an attempt to set forth strict numerical 
formulas or rigid answers would “deprive institutions of the flexibility to 
which they are entitled when deciding how best to comply with the law.”58  
However, the 1996 Clarification “provides specific factors that guide an 
analysis of each part of the three-part test” and includes examples “to 
demonstrate, in concrete terms, how these factors will be considered.”59 
In 2003, OCR issued a “Further Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics 
Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance (2003 Clarification).”60  The 
2003 Clarification noted that Title IX does not require cutting or reduction of 
teams; indeed such a practice is disfavored.61  It also noted that OCR will 
“aggressively enforce Title IX standards, including implementing sanctions for 
institutions that do not comply,”62 but that it will also work with schools to 
achieve compliance and avoid such sanctions.63  
B. Administrative Remedial Scheme 
The express statutory means of enforcement of Title IX are purely 
administrative.64  Title IX directs each federal department and agency 
empowered to extend federal financial assistance to any education program or 
activity to establish requirements to effectuate the nondiscriminatory mandate 
of the statute.65  In 1980, the DOE added a compliance requirement to Title 
IX’s implementing regulations.66  Under this requirement, each recipient of 
federal funds must execute a compliance agreement with the federal 
 
58. Id. 
59. Id.; see also Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887, at *46.  The 1996 Clarification also expressly 
noted that schools are permitted, though not encouraged, to meet proportionality standards by 
reducing athletic opportunities for men.  1996 Clarification, supra note 56; Samuels & Galles, supra 
note 6, at 17. 
60. Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Further Clarification of 
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/title9 
guidanceFinal.html.  [hereinafter 2003 Clarification]. 
61. Judge, supra note 28, § 11.1. 
62. 2003 Clarification, supra note 60. 
63. Judge, supra note 28, § 11.1.  In 2010, the OCR issued another clarification letter, discussing 
compliance under prong three of the three-part test.  The letter also withdrew the clarification letter 
relating to this prong that was issued in 2005.  Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, 
Dear Colleague Letter: Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Clarification: The Three-Part Test – Part 
Three, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 20, 2010), at 1 available at http://ed. 
gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20100420.html. 
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.     
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1682; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280–81 (1998). 
66. Assurance Required, 34 C.F.R. 106.4 (1980). 
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government, indicating that the educational institution is not discriminating on 
the basis of sex in its programs and activities.67  Title IX further provides that 
compliance may be enforced by any means authorized by law, including the 
“termination of or refusal to grant or continue assistance” after the opportunity 
for a hearing and an express finding of noncompliance.68 
An individual seeking redress for a Title IX violation can utilize the 
internal grievance process that every educational institution receiving federal 
funds is required to have.69  She may also file an administrative complaint 
with the OCR within the DOE, which would trigger an investigation into the 
allegations.70  Such an investigation is not necessarily limited to the specific 
program area raised in the complaint.71  Rather, “if during the investigation 
there is evidence to suggest that a disparity in a program component being 
investigated is the result of an apparent disparity in another program 
component that is not being investigated, then that program [area] should be 
investigated.”72  Moreover, the OCR may unilaterally choose to investigate 
whether an institution is in compliance.73  If after investigation the OCR 
concludes that an institution has violated Title IX, it may terminate federal 
funding to the institution or institute other lawful proceedings.74   
Significantly, however, the DOE may not initiate any enforcement 
proceedings, including the termination of funding, until it “has advised the 
appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement 
and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.”75  
 
67. Id. (“Every application for Federal financial assistance shall as condition of its approval 
contain or be accompanied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the 
Assistant Secretary, that the education program or activity operated by the applicant or recipient and 
to which this part applies will be operated in compliance with this part.”); Heckman, supra note 55, at 
210–11. 
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
69. Designation of Responsible Employee and Adoption of Grievance Procedures, 34 C.F.R. 
106.8(b) (“A recipient shall adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and 
equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which would be 
prohibited by this part.”); Heckman, supra note 55, at 216.   
70. Conduct of Investigations, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b); Heckman, supra note 55 at 216.   
71. Heckman, supra note 55, at 216. 
72. Id. at 217 (citing DIANE HECKMAN, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUNDATION REPORT ON TITLE IX, 
ATHLETICS AND THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS:  AN EXAMINATION OF LETTERS OF FINDINGS 
ISSUED BY THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ON THE POST-RESTORATION ACT ERA 206 n.99 (1997)). 
73. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7; Heckman, supra note 55, at 216.  Historically, the OCR has chosen not to 
conduct a significant number of these periodic compliance reviews.  Heckman, supra note 55, at 216–
17. 
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.  The complainant would not be able to obtain money damages for any 
violations.  Heckman, supra note 55, at 217.    
75. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1).  A settlement, called a compliance plan, between the institution and 
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Similarly, the administrative regulations require resolution of compliance 
issues “by informal means whenever possible,”76 and prohibit enforcement 
proceedings absent a showing the aid recipient “has been notified of its failure 
to comply and of the action to be taken to effect compliance.”77  Thus, both 
the statute and its implementing regulations condition enforcement 
proceedings on notice and an opportunity to cure noncompliance. 
C. Private Right of Action 
Title IX does not include an express private right of action in the language 
of the statute.  Furthermore, the statute was enacted pursuant to Congress’ 
authority under the Spending Clause.78  Accordingly, in determining whether 
a private right of action exists and interpreting the scope of such a right, courts 
must look to both the congressional intent underlying the statute as well as the 
scope of Congress’ power in enacting the statute. 
1. Implied Private Rights of Action and the Spending Clause 
In determining whether a private right of action can be inferred from a 
federal statute, the Court looks to statutory construction,79 the focal point of 
which is Congress’ intent in interpreting the statute.80  In Cort v. Ash, the 
Court enumerated four factors relevant to determining whether a private 
remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one:81  (1) “whether the 
statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a 
member;”82 (2) whether the legislative history indicates congressional intent to 
provide such a remedy;83  (3) whether a private remedy would frustrate the 
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme;84  and (4) “whether implying a 
federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area 
basically of concern to the States.”85  This more restrictive analysis was a 
departure from the Court’s previous emphasis on the desirability of implying 
private rights of action in order to provide remedies that might better 
 
the OCR may be reached without the complainant’s acquiescence.  Heckman, supra note 55, at 217. 
76. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1). 
77. Procedure for Effecting Compliance, 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(d)(2). 
78. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). 
79. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). 
80. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).   
81. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975). 
82. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689. 
83. Id. at 694. 
84. Id. at 703. 
85. Id. at 708. 
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effectuate the purposes of a given statute.86   
The Court subsequently clarified that despite the relevance of the four 
Cort factors, the dispositive question is whether Congress intended to create a 
private remedy;87 indeed, the first three Cort factors are those traditionally 
relied upon by the Court in determining legislative intent.88  As such, the 
touchstone for determining whether an implied right of action can be inferred 
from a federal statute is Congressional intent to create one based upon the 
statute, beginning with the language itself.89  The other factors may serve to 
further support a conclusion that Congress intended such a remedy, especially 
where the language itself is ambiguous.90 
When interpreting rights and available remedies in legislation enacted 
pursuant to Congress’ power under the Spending Clause,91 the Court has been 
particularly cautious in finding implied rights and remedies.92  Typically, the 
remedy for state noncompliance with conditions imposed by federal Spending 
Clause legislation is action by the federal government to withdraw or 
terminate federal funding.93  However, to the extent that an implied right of 
action is available, the Court has analogized the benefits and obligations to 
those in the nature of a contract: “in return for federal funds, the recipients 
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”94  As such, akin to basic 
contract law principles that require offer and acceptance, “the legitimacy of 
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power rests on whether the 
[recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.”95  
The Court has applied this contract law analogy in determining the scope of 
 
86. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1964) (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to be 
alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”). 
87. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
88. Redington, 442 U.S. at 575–76. 
89. Id. at 568.  The Court has also noted that “intent may appear implicitly in the language or 
structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment.”  Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 
(quoting Lewis, 444 U.S. at 18). 
90. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (“We have never accorded dispositive 
weight to context shorn of text.  In determining whether statutes create private rights of action, as in 
interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text.  We therefore 
begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress’ intent with the text and structure of Title 
VI.”) (internal citations omitted). 
91. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
92. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185–86 (2002). 
93. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).  In the twenty years 
following its decision in Pennhurst, the Court has only twice found that Spending Clause legislation 
gave rise to enforceable rights.  Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002). 
94. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186. 
95. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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conduct for which a funding recipient may be liable,96 the remedies 
available,97 and the scope of such remedies.98  Accordingly, a recipient of 
federal funds may be liable only for conduct that violated the clear terms of 
the statute and may be subjected only to remedies that it had notice of.99  With 
respect to available remedies, “[a] funding recipient is generally on notice that 
it is subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant 
legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits for breach 
of contract,” such as compensatory damages and injunctive relief.100 
2. Private Right of Action under Title IX 
The plain text of Title IX does not provide for a private enforcement 
scheme.  However, in 1972, the Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago 
that Congress intended to create a cause of action in favor of private victims of 
discrimination.  In Cannon, the plaintiff alleged that her applications for 
admission to medical school were denied by the defendants, whose education 
programs were receiving federal financial assistance, because she was a 
woman.101  The Court analyzed the four factors set forth in Cort to determine 
whether Congress intended to provide a remedy to a special class of 
litigants.102  
With respect to the first Cort factor, the Court held that it weighed in favor 
of inferring a private remedy because the plain language of the statute 
expressly identified a distinct class to be benefitted by the legislation.103  The 
Court reasoned that  
[t]here would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in 
favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting 
Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, 
had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by 
recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the 
disbursement of public funds to educational institutions 
 
96. Id.; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999). 
97. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74–75. 
98. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187. 
99. Id.; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 640; Franklin, 503 U.S. 60, 74–75. 
100. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187 (holding that punitive damages were not available because such 
damages are generally not available for breach of contract). 
101. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680. 
102. Cort, 422 U.S. 66. 
103. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693–94.  
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engaged in discriminatory practices.104  
With respect to the second Cort factor, the Court held that it had “no doubt 
that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those 
available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as authorizing an 
implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited 
discrimination.”105  The Court noted that Title VI and Title IX use nearly 
identical language to describe the benefitted class and that both statutes 
provide the same administrative mechanism for terminating federal financial 
support for institutions engaged in prohibited discrimination.106  Further, the 
Court reasoned that representatives must have been aware that at least one 
federal court of appeals and a dozen federal district courts had concluded that 
Title VI created a private remedy and that the parallel constructions reflected 
an intent to create a similar private remedy with respect to Title IX.107 
With respect to the third Cort factor, the Court held that a private remedy 
would further, not hinder, the dual purposes of Title IX, namely to avoid the 
use of federal funds at institutions that support sex discrimination and to 
provide individual citizens effective relief against such practices.  Specifically, 
the Court reasoned that while the first purpose is served by the statutory 
procedure for terminating federal funding, such a remedy is “severe and often 
may not provide an appropriate means of accomplishing the second purpose if 
merely an isolated violation has occurred.”108  The Court also noted that it 
would make little sense to require that an individual prove that an institution’s 
discriminatory practices are so pervasive to warrant the complete termination 
 
104. Id. at 690–93.  The Court observed that “a statute declarative of a civil right will almost 
have to be stated in terms of the benefitted class . . . because the right to be free of discrimination is a 
‘personal’ one . . . .”  Id. at 690 n.13.  As such, and unlike statutes benefitting the public at large, “a 
statute conferring such a right will almost have to be phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.”  Id.  
Indeed, the Court also noted that Congress passed over an alternative proposal that was phrased as a 
directive to the Secretary of HEW not to make any disbursement of federal funds to an institution that 
discriminates on the basis of sex.  Id. at 693 n.14. 
105. Id. at 703. 
106. Id. at 695–96. 
107. Id. at 696–98.   
108. Id. at 705.  Indeed, Congress noted the severity of the termination of federal funding, 
describing it as a last resort, “all else—including ‘lawsuits’—failing.”  Id. at 705 n.38 (citing 110 
Cong. Rec. 7067 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff)).  One of the dissents, however, notes that the 
drastic nature of this ultimate remedy does not evidence congressional intent to allow a private 
remedy.  “Rather, Congress considered termination of financial assistance to be a remedy of last 
resort, and expressly obligated federal agencies to take measures to terminate discrimination without 
resorting to termination of funding.”  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 719–20 (White, J., dissenting).  The dissent 
also notes that the reference to litigation in the legislative history referred to suits against public 
institutions, not an expanded private remedy.  Id. at 727 (White, J., dissenting). 
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of federal funds when such a plaintiff seeks only enforcement of a statute in a 
particular case.109  Rather, “In that situation, the violation might be remedied 
more efficiently by an order requiring an institution to accept an applicant who 
had been improperly excluded.”110  Moreover, the Court observed that while 
excerpts of the legislative history expressed concern with the procedure for 
terminating federal funding, none of the excerpts evidenced “any hostility 
toward an implied private remedy to terminate the offending 
discrimination.”111 
Finally, the Court concluded that the fourth Cort factor also weighed in 
favor of a private right of action because the expenditure of federal funds 
justified the particular statutory prohibition.  As such, a federal private right of 
action did not intrude upon an area principally of state concern. 
Accordingly, the Court held that all four Cort factors supported the 
inference that Congress intended to provide a private right of action in Title 
IX.  The Court rejected the argument that the risk of litigation would inhibit 
university administrators’ ability to independently and professionally 
discharge important responsibilities, noting that “[w]hatever disruption of the 
academic community may accompany an occasional individual suit seeking 
admission is dwarfed by the relief expressly contemplated by the statute.”112  
As such, the Court concluded that “[n]ot only the words and history of Title 
IX, but also its subject matter and underlying purposes, counsel implication of 
a cause of action in favor of private victims of discrimination.”113  
In 1986, Congress validated the Court’s holding in Cannon with the 
enactment of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986.114  The statute 
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under various civil rights 
legislation, including Title IX, expressly noting that “remedies (including 
remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the 
 
109. Id. at 705–06.   
110. Id. at 705.  The Court also cited to legislative history of Title VI that acknowledged the 
existence of and need for less drastic remedies than full termination of federal funds.  Id. at 705 n.38. 
Personally, I think it would be a rare case when funds would actually be cut off.  In most 
cases, alternative remedies, principally lawsuits to end discrimination, would be the 
preferable and more effective remedy.  If a Negro child were kept out of a school 
receiving Federal funds, I think it would be better to get the Negro child into school than 
to cut off funds and impair the education of the white children.  
 Id. (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7067 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff)).  
111. Id. at 711. 
112. Id. at 710 n.44. 
113. Id. at 709. 
114. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845 (1986) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d-7 (2011)); see Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72. 
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same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit 
against any public or private entity other than a State.”115 
Subsequently, in 1992, the Court expressly held that money damages were 
an available remedy for intentional violations of Title IX.116  In Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Public Schools, the plaintiff brought a Title IX suit arising 
out of allegations that a teacher subjected the plaintiff to continual sexual 
harassment while a student, and that despite awareness and an investigation of 
the situation, teachers and administrators took no action and indeed 
discouraged the plaintiff from pressing charges.117  The Court noted the 
general presumption that all appropriate remedies are available unless 
Congress expressly indicates to the contrary and that “[s]ince the Court in 
Cannon concluded that this statute supported no express right of action, it is 
hardly surprising that Congress also said nothing about the applicable 
remedies for an implied right of action.”118  Moreover, the Court rejected the 
argument that remedies were limited for both intentional and unintentional 
violations to the extent Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress’ Spending 
Clause power; rather, the Court noted that the presumption against money 
damages applied only to unintentional violations because “the receiving entity 
of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.”119  
Accordingly, because the case presented claims for only intentional 
discrimination, the Court concluded that petitioner could sue under Title IX 
for monetary damages.120   
D. Notice and Opportunity to Cure 
Despite the widespread connotation of Title IX with gender equality in 
athletic opportunities, there are only a handful of lawsuits that interpret the 
provisions relating to effective accommodation or equal treatment of women 
in athletics under Title IX.121  Rather, the majority of substantive Title IX 
litigation before the lower courts, and the only ones to make it before the 
Supreme Court arise from allegations of sexual discrimination, sexual 
 
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2). 
116. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. 
117. Id. at 63–64 
118. Id. at 66, 71.  The concurrence noted its view that “when rights of action are judicially 
‘implied,’ categorical limitations upon their remedial scope may be judicially implied as well.”  Id. at 
77 (Scalia, J., concurring).  However, the concurrence concluded that a judicially implied exclusion of 
damages under Title IX would be inappropriate in light of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 
1986.  Id. at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
119. Id. at 74. 
120. Id. at 76. 
121. Cohen, supra note 22, at 312–13. 
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harassment, or related retaliation.122  Indeed, it was within the context of a 
sexual harassment case that the Supreme Court introduced a notice 
requirement into the Title IX liability analysis. 
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Court first 
addressed the contours and limits of a private right of action for monetary 
damages under Title IX.123  In Gebser, a high school student brought suit 
against her teacher and the school district as a result of the teacher’s initiation 
of a sexual relationship.124  The student did not report the relationship to 
school officials, and there was no evidence that the school district had actual 
or constructive notice that the teacher was involved in a sexual relationship 
with a student.125  The Court affirmed the dismissal of the student’s Title IX 
claim against the school district, holding that damages may not be recovered 
“unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to 
institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, and is 
deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct.”126  
In reaching this holding, the Court emphasized that “[b]ecause the private 
right of action under Title IX is judicially implied, we have a measure of 
latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme that best comports with the 
statute.”127  In determining the scope of the available remedies, the Court 
examined Title IX to ensure that it fashioned the scope of the implied right “in 
a manner [not] at odds with the statutory structure and purpose.”128  
Specifically, the Court noted that, unlike other civil rights statutes that focus 
on compensating victims of discrimination, “Title IX focuses more on 
‘protecting’ individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients 
of federal funds.”129  Furthermore, the structure of Title IX, which is 
essentially a contract between the government and the recipients of federal 
funds,130 prompted the Court to closely examine “the propriety of private 
actions holding the recipient liable in monetary damages for noncompliance 
 
122. Id. at 313; see Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of 
Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
123. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. 
124. Id. at 277–78. 
125. Id. at 278–79. 
126. Id. at 277. 
127. Id. at 284. 
128. Id. at 284. 
129. Id. at 287 (noting that the Court first recognized an implied right of action under Title IX in 
a claim for injunctive or equitable relief). 
130. Id. at 286 (explaining that, like Title VII, Title IX conditions “an offer of federal funding on 
a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the 
Government and the recipient of funds.”). 
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with the condition”131 in order to ensure “‘that the receiving entity of federal 
funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.’”132   
Finally, and “[m]ost significantly,” the Court placed weight on the express 
notice requirement and remedial scheme set forth in the statute and 
implementing regulations.133  Under the statute, an agency may not initiate 
enforcement proceedings until it “has advised the appropriate person or 
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that 
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.”134  Similarly, the 
implementing regulations require resolution of compliance issues “by informal 
means whenever possible”135 and prohibit the termination of or refusal to 
grant or continue federal financial assistance until the recipient has been 
advised of the failure to comply, the agency has determined that voluntary 
compliance is unobtainable, and an express finding of noncompliance is made 
after an opportunity for hearing.136  Further, no other lawfully authorized 
action to effect compliance can be taken until the agency has determined that 
voluntary compliance is unobtainable and the recipient “has been notified of 
its failure to comply and of the action to be taken to effect compliance.”137  
Where a violation is found, the regulations provide that a funding recipient 
may be required to take the remedial action deemed “necessary to overcome 
the effects of such discrimination.”138  However, while such remedial action 
may provide equitable relief to a specific victim,139 “the regulations do not 
appear to contemplate a condition ordering payment of monetary damages, 
and there is no indication that payment of damages has been demanded as a 
condition of finding a recipient to be in compliance with the statute.”140   
The Court presumed that a central purpose of the administrative notice and 
opportunity to cure mechanisms was “to avoid diverting education funding 
from beneficial uses where a recipient was unaware of discrimination in its 
 
131. Id. at 287. 
132. Id. (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74). 
133. Id. at 288–89. 
134. 20 U.S.C. § 1682(2). 
135. 34 C.F.R. 100.7(d) (“If an investigation pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section indicates a 
failure to comply with this part, the responsible Department official or his designee will so inform the 
recipient and the matter will be resolved by informal means whenever possible.”). 
136. Procedure for Effective Compliance, 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(c).  
137. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(d). 
138. Remedial and Affirmative Action and Self-Evaluation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a); Gebser, 524 
U.S. at 288. 
139. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288 (citing North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 518 
(1982)). 
140. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288–89. 
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programs and is willing to institute prompt corrective measures.”141  As such, 
the Court concluded that “[w]here a statute’s express enforcement scheme 
hinges its most severe sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to obtain 
compliance, we cannot attribute to Congress the intention to have implied an 
enforcement scheme that allows imposition of greater liability without 
comparable conditions.”142  Accordingly, the Court held that “a damages 
remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has 
authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective 
measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in 
the recipient’s programs and fails to adequately respond” by making an 
official decision not to remedy the known violation.143   
Subsequently, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles by holding that a suit for private 
damages may lie against a school in cases of student-on-student sexual 
harassment only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference 
to known acts of harassment that are so severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive as to effectively bar a victim’s access to an educational opportunity 
or benefit.144  The Court again noted that Title IX was enacted by Congress 
pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause and that “there can, of course, 
be no knowing acceptance [of the terms of the putative contract] if a State is 
unaware of the conditions imposed by the legislation or is unable to ascertain 
what is expected of it.”145  In concluding that a funding recipient can be liable 
for an official decision not to remedy a known violation where it “exercises 
substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known 
harassment occurs,”146 the Court reaffirmed the prerequisites of actual 
knowledge and conduct amounting to deliberate indifference in stating a claim 
for money damages under Title IX.147  
Indeed, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of actual 
knowledge of Title IX violations in holding that a funding recipient could be 
liable for intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX 
for retaliating against a person that complains of sex discrimination.148  
Specifically, the Court stressed that Title IX’s enforcement scheme “depends 
 
141. Id. at 289. 
142. Id. at 290. 
143. Id. at 290. 
144. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. 
145. Id. at 640. 
146. Id. at 645. 
147. Id. at 650. 
148. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174, 181.  
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on individual reporting because individuals and agencies may not bring suit 
under the statute unless the recipient has received ‘actual notice’ of the 
discrimination.”149  Accordingly, protection from retaliation for such 
individual reporting is necessary to ensure that unlawful discrimination does 
not go unremedied.150  Further, the Court noted that, unlike other forms of 
individual sexual discrimination or harassment, retaliatory conduct is easily 
attributable to the funding recipient and is, by definition, intentional.151 
II. IS NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE REQUIRED? 
While it is clearly established that there is a private right of action under 
Title IX, that compensatory damages and injunctive relief are available 
remedies to such a right, and that an appropriate official must have knowledge 
of the alleged violation in claims of sexual harassment, the scope of the private 
right of action and available remedies for claims arising out of systemic 
ineffective accommodation has not been conclusively addressed.  
Because the Supreme Court has held only that actual notice by appropriate 
officials is required in sexual harassment cases, it is unclear whether and how 
this standard should be applied in other types of cases brought under Title 
IX.152  Specifically, it is unclear whether notice and opportunity to cure is a 
prerequisite to Title IX suits challenging an institution’s equal provision of 
athletic opportunities.  The three circuits to address this issue have reached 
inconsistent conclusions. 
A. Pederson v. Louisiana State University 
As the first federal appellate court to address the issue, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the Supreme Court’s holding in Gebser and Davis had “little 
relevance” in determining whether the funding recipient in the case before it 
had engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination.153  In Pederson, female 
students attending Louisiana State University (LSU) challenged the 
university’s provision of facilities and teams for intercollegiate athletic 
competition.154  The trial court concluded that LSU was in violation of Title 
IX.  Specifically, the court found that during the relevant time period, LSU’s 
 
149. Id. at 181. 
150. Id. at 180. 
151. Id. at 183. 
152. Cohen, supra note 22 (arguing that Gebser’s notice requirement should not apply to non-
sexual harassment discrimination cases brought under Title IX).  
153. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 882. 
154. Id. at 864. 
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student population was approximately 51% male and 49% female and its 
athletic participation for the same period was approximately 71% male and 
29% female, despite demonstrated interest by female student-athletes for more 
athletic opportunities.155  Moreover, prior to verbally committing to add two 
women’s intercollegiate varsity teams in 1993, LSU had added no new 
women’s teams in fourteen years; rather, it had eliminated a successful 
women’s intercollegiate varsity team in 1983 with no credible reason given.156  
The court also found that LSU had not honored its commitment regarding the 
addition of two new women’s teams.  Furthermore, the court found that LSU 
led a minority movement in the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) to resist changes toward gender equity in athletics within the NCAA.  
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that LSU had not effectively 
accommodated female student-athletes and was therefore in violation of Title 
IX.157  
However, the trial court also ruled that LSU was not liable for monetary 
damages because it did not intentionally violate the statute.158  The court noted 
that, although the question was a close one, the violations were not the result 
of intentional discrimination, but rather of “arrogant ignorance, confusion 
regarding the practical requirements of the law, and a remarkably outdated 
view of women and athletics which created the byproduct of resistance to 
change.”159  The court found that LSU’s athletic director credibly believed 
that the women’s athletic program was “wonderful” and that LSU’s disparate 
treatment of women in athletics was based upon outdated assumptions of 
women’s abilities.160  The trial court also noted the confusion relating to Title 
IX, both with respect to application and interpretation, since its enactment.161  
As such, the trial court held that LSU, through the actions of its athletic 
director, was “negligent in not adapting to the changing social and athletic 
landscape,” but did not have the requisite intent to impose monetary damages 
on the university.162 
 
155. The Pederson court found that there was ample evidence of interest in women’s fast-pitch 
softball and soccer.  Id. at 878.  At trial, the plaintiffs established that (1) a number of current LSU 
female students wanted to try out for fast-pitch softball or soccer; (2) well over 5,000 female high 
school students were playing fast-pitch softball or soccer; and (3) many former members of a local 
soccer club had received scholarships to play intercollegiate soccer.  Id. at 868. 
156. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915–16. 
157. Id. at 916–17. 
158. Id. at 918–21. 
159. Id. at 918. 
160. Id. at 919–20. 
161. Id. at 919. 
162. Id. at 921. 
YAP (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  3:38 PM 
540 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
In reversing the trial court’s ruling regarding liability for money damages, 
the Fifth Circuit held that “the requirement in the sexual harassment cases—
that the academic institution have actual knowledge of the sexual 
harassment—is not applicable for purposes of determining whether an 
academic institution intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex by denying 
females equal athletic opportunity” because in the latter circumstance “it is the 
institution itself that is discriminating.”163  Because the Fifth Circuit found 
that the record evidenced LSU’s intention to treat women differently on the 
basis of their sex by offering them unequal athletic opportunity, it held that 
LSU had intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex and was therefore 
liable for money damages.164 
B. Grandson v. University of Minnesota 
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit concluded that failure to provide an 
education institution notice and a reasonable opportunity to rectify alleged 
violations serves as a bar to private actions for monetary damages under Title 
IX.165  In Grandson, female students filed claims for injunctive relief against 
the University of Minnesota following an investigation by OCR.  OCR had 
notified the university that a Title IX complaint, alleging ineffective 
accommodation, unequal financial assistance, and unequal opportunities in 
athletics, had been filed.  Within the year, the university and OCR entered into 
an agreement to resolve the complaint, which included increasing women’s 
athletic opportunities, financial assistance, and support, as well as status 
reports and administrative monitoring by OCR.166  Two months prior to the 
university’s entry into the agreement, individual plaintiffs brought suit for 
injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and similarly situated female 
students.167  Subsequently—almost three months after the university had 
entered into the agreement—the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their 
complaint to assert claims for money damages.168 
In affirming the trial court’s denial of leave to amend, the Eighth Circuit 
emphasized that the express remedy in Title IX “operates on an assumption of 
prior notice of alleged discrimination to the funding recipient and an 
opportunity to rectify any violation voluntarily.”169  The court also noted that 
 
163. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 882. 
164. Id. 
165. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 575. 
166. Id. at 572. 
167. Id. 
168. Id.  
169. Id. at 575. 
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OCR’s three-part test provides flexible standards for compliance, and given 
Gebser’s emphasis that money damages should not be awarded except for 
knowing violations, claims from a specific Title IX violation require “prior 
notice to a university official with authority to address the complaint and a 
response demonstrating deliberate indifference to the alleged violation.”170  
C. Mansourian v. Regents of the University of California 
Finally, in the most recent case to address the issue, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the approach of the Fifth Circuit in concluding that Gebser’s 
notice requirement is not applicable to university decisions with respect to 
athletics.171  In Mansourian, female student-athletes at the University of 
California, Davis (UCD) who had participated on the men’s varsity wrestling 
team brought suit after they were eliminated from the team when UCD 
imposed roster caps on all the men’s teams to help aid in Title IX 
compliance.172  Prior to bringing suit, the women had filed a complaint with 
OCR regarding their removal from the wrestling team; however, plaintiffs did 
not file a claim with OCR or otherwise give UCD officials notice of a claim 
arising from the alleged ineffective accommodation of women in the athletic 
program at UCD.173  During the course of the litigation, all of the plaintiffs 
graduated from UCD; as such, there were no viable claims for injunctive 
relief, only for money damages.174  Rather, current female students filed a 
separate class action suit for injunctive relief, and a settlement for broad-
ranging injunctive relief was reached between the class and UCD.175  The trial 
court held that all plaintiffs’ claims arising from specific conduct relating to 
the removal from and tryout policies for the men’s varsity wrestling team were 
time-barred.176  The trial court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ ineffective 
accommodation claim must be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to give 
UCD notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged violation of a university-
wide failure to provide sufficient athletic opportunities for female student-
athletes.   
In reversing the trial court’s decision with respect to the notice 
 
170. Id. at 576. 
171. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968. 
172. Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887. 
173. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 962. 
174. Id. at 962–63. 
175. Stipulated Judgment and Order, Brust v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 07-1488 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 19, 2009). 
176. Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 2:03-cv-2591, 2007 WL 3046034, at 
*5–*6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007). 
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requirement, the Ninth Circuit noted that, unlike sexual harassment cases, 
“[i]nstitutions, not individual actors, decide how to allocate resources between 
male and female athletic teams” and that “[a]thletic programs that fail 
effectively to accommodate students of both sexes thus represent ‘official 
policy of the recipient entity’ and so are not covered by Gebser’s notice 
requirement.”177  Further, the court reasoned that “a judicially imposed notice 
requirement would be superfluous in light of universities’ ongoing obligations 
to certify compliance with Title IX’s athletics requirements and to track 
athletics gender equity data.”178  Rather, if in compliance with its statutory and 
regulatory duties, a university should be aware of whether it is providing equal 
athletic opportunities to women.  As such, the Ninth Circuit “[joined] the Fifth 
Circuit in holding that Gebser’s notice requirement is inapplicable to cases 
alleging that a funding recipient has failed  effectively to accommodate 
women’s interest in athletics.”179 
III. NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE SHOULD BE REQUIRED IN SUITS 
FOR MONEY DAMAGES BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ACCOMMODATION UNDER 
TITLE IX 
With respect to claims for money damages arising out the alleged systemic 
ineffective accommodation of opportunities for female student-athletes, notice 
to the educational institution of the alleged claim as well as an opportunity to 
cure should be a prerequisite to suit.  Notice and an opportunity to cure is most 
consistent with statutory construction principles applied to implied private 
rights of action in Spending Clause legislation.  Moreover, such a requirement 
is sound policy, both in promoting the equal treatment of female students in 
athletics and limiting educational institutions’ exposure to monetary liability if 
they voluntarily correct violations brought to their attention.   
A. Notice and an Opportunity to Cure is Supported by Statutory 
Construction 
Because the legitimacy of Congress’ Spending Clause authority is based 
upon the knowing and voluntary agreement to the terms of the funding by the 
recipient, an educational institution should be entitled to notice and an 
opportunity to cure alleged violations of systemic ineffective accommodation 
before being subjected to a suit for money damages.  As discussed, supra, both 
the private right of action and the availability of money damages under Title 
 
177. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968 (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 969. 
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IX have been judicially implied; the statute is silent with respect to the manner 
and means that an educational institution should be held liable for private 
suits.  Indeed, the Gebser Court expressly noted the latitude it had to shape a 
sensible remedial scheme that best comports with the statute.180  Accordingly, 
in determining the manner and means that an institution may be exposed to 
broad monetary liability to approximately half of its student population and 
recent graduates, the guiding principle should be the statute itself and its 
supporting regulatory scheme.181  
As an initial matter, one of the dual purposes of Title IX is to provide 
individual citizens effective protection against discriminatory practices in 
education on the basis of gender.182  This purpose is most clearly served by 
remedies that actually end the discrimination, which come in the form of 
injunctive and other equitable relief.183  Because the focus of Title IX is the 
protection of individuals from discriminatory practices, not the compensation 
of victims of discrimination, courts should be wary of interpreting the statute 
in a way that unnecessarily exposes educational institutions to excessive 
monetary liability.184  
The express regulatory means of enforcement and its focus on voluntary 
compliance militates in favor of a notice requirement in suits for money 
damages.185  Notice and an attempt to secure voluntary compliance is a 
prerequisite to agency enforcement proceedings.186  The statutory and 
regulatory language repeatedly emphasizes the primary goal of achieving 
voluntary compliance by the recipient entity.187  These provisions are 
expressly aimed at ensuring compliance in a recipient’s programs,188 
 
180. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. 
181. See id. 
182. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704–05.  
183. The Cannon Court expressly contemplated relief aimed at remedying the alleged 
discriminatory situation.  Id. at 705 (“In that situation, the violation might be remedied more 
efficiently by an order requiring an institution to accept an applicant who had been improperly 
excluded.”).  In examining the legislative history, the Court specifically noted that none of the 
comments evidenced “any hostility toward an implied private remedy to terminate the offending 
discrimination.”  Id. at 711 (emphasis added). 
184. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285–86.  In Gebser, the Court rejected the possibility of unlimited 
recovery of damages under Title IX.  The Court noted that when Congress made damages available 
under Title VII in 1991, it carefully limited the amount of damages in each individual case.  The 
Court concluded that it would be incongruous to allow greater recovery under Title IX, where 
Congress had not spoken at all on the issue of damages and where, unlike Title VII, the focus of the 
statute was on protection of individuals, not compensation.  Id. 
185. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8; see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288. 
186. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288. 
187. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288. 
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
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practices, and policies.189  Under Spending Clause principles, the terms of the 
“contract” put a funding recipient on notice only that it is subject to potential 
financial consequences after the institution was made aware of the complaints 
against it and given a reasonable opportunity to respond.190  Therefore, it is 
not only “unsound” but also contrary to principles of statutory interpretation, 
“for a statute’s express system of enforcement to require notice to the recipient 
and an opportunity to come into voluntary compliance while a judicially 
implied system of enforcement permits substantial liability without regard to 
the recipient’s knowledge or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.”191 
Importing the safeguards set forth in the express enforcement system into 
the judicially implied enforcement scheme is particularly important in claims 
for money damages where recovery could exceed the level of federal 
funding.192  In a claim for ineffective accommodation, any female student-
athlete currently attending the institution, as well as those who graduated 
within the relevant statute of limitations, would have standing to bring suit for 
money damages if their sport of choice was not offered at the varsity level, 
regardless of their skill level.193  To establish the requisite standing, a plaintiff 
need only demonstrate that she is or was “able and ready to compete for a 
position on the unfielded team.”194  Further, because these damages claims, by 
definition, do not seek the actual fielding of the athletic team, plaintiffs who 
are no longer students and who are ineligible to compete may be compensated 
for past violations, thus increasing the number of potential plaintiffs.  Potential 
damages may include the value of lost scholarship opportunities, educational 
services provided to varsity athletes, and other benefits received by varsity 
athletes, as well as any actual injury suffered as a result of the failure to 
provide opportunities.  Moreover, it is possible that recovery could be 
attempted as a class.195  Accordingly, it is probable that the amount of 
 
189. 34 CFR § 100.7. 
190. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (“The administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that an 
official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into 
compliance.”). 
191. Id. at 289 (emphasis in original). 
192. See id. at 289–90. 
193. See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 871.  In order to have standing, the potential plaintiffs would also 
likely need to demonstrate eligibility.  See id. 
194. Id. at 871. 
195. Where the injury alleged is the systemic deprivation of athletic opportunities due to unequal 
and illegal funding decisions, the questions of programmatic liability would likely be common across 
a class of current and former female students; it would be only the measurement of damages that 
might differ among the members of the class.  However, individualized damage calculations, alone, 
may not defeat class treatment.  See Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 
(9th Cir. 2010).  
YAP (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  3:38 PM 
2012] PAY OR PLAY?  545 
damages arising out of an ineffective accommodation claim could exceed a 
recipient’s level of federal funding.196  The Court has noted that “[w]here a 
statute’s express enforcement scheme hinges its most severe sanction on 
notice and unsuccessful efforts to obtain compliance, we cannot attribute to 
Congress the intention to have implied an enforcement scheme that allows 
imposition of greater liability without comparable conditions.”197  As such, 
requiring notice and an opportunity to cure prior to filing a lawsuit for money 
damages is both consistent with and supported by the express enforcement 
mechanism.198 
The flexible nature of the regulatory compliance framework further 
supports the need for notice in claims arising out of alleged ineffective 
accommodation.  While Title IX’s mandate against discrimination on the basis 
of gender is clear, the application of that mandate to athletic programs is far 
from it.  Courts have routinely relied on the three-part test set forth in the 1979 
Interpretation in determining programmatic compliance with Title IX.  
However, OCR has emphasized that compliance with the three-part test is 
itself “case- and fact- specific.”199  And, there is sparse statutory, regulatory, 
or judicial guidance with respect to these factors.200 
For example, under the first prong of the three-part test, a university may 
demonstrate compliance by showing that “intercollegiate level participation 
opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers 
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments.”201  However, there 
is no authoritative guidance regarding what percentage disparity constitutes 
“substantial proportionality.”  A number of nonauthoritative sources refer to 
narrowing proportionality to a 5% disparity as sufficient to satisfy prong 
one.202  This calculation ignores the actual number of students enrolled as well 
 
196. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
197. Id. at 290. 
198. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 289–90 (analyzing the method of agency enforcement in 
determining whether Congress intended to create privately enforceable rights). 
199. 1996 Clarification, supra note 56. 
200. See generally Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind 
Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 61 (2001) (“[T]he courts have not yet explicitly articulated the 
theory of equality that does underlie the three-part test, nor have they fully explored its implications.  
Court decisions adopting the three-part test have not looked beyond the disparities in participation 
opportunities to more fully understand the relationship between how sport programs are structured 
and the shaping of men’s and women’s interest in sport.”); See Jerry R. Parkinson, Grappling with 
Gender Equity, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (1996) (noting that despite a handful of cases and 
OCR guidance, the law surrounding compliance with the three-part test is still unclear). 
201. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42.   
202. In 1993, the California State University System entered into a settlement by which it agreed 
that each campus with an NCAA athletic program would raise the level of female athletic 
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as the number of athletic opportunities.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, 
other nonauthoritative sources assert that an institution cannot achieve 
substantial proportionality unless the number of underrepresented athletes is 
insufficient to field a varsity athletic team.203  This formulation would seem to 
be highly problematic if one undertakes to include sports that focus on the 
individual, such as swimming, track and field, and gymnastics, where a “team” 
can theoretically be fielded with a small number of athletes.204 
Similarly, under the second prong of the three-part test, a university may 
demonstrate compliance by showing “a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing 
interest and abilities of the members” of the underrepresented class.205  As 
with prong one, there is little to no authoritative guidance as to what 
constitutes a sufficient history and continuing practice of program expansion 
under prong two.  While the 1996 Clarification provides a number of 
illustrative examples, it does not provide any hard and fast rules for 
determining compliance.206  Indeed, the 1996 Clarification allows for the 
possibility of satisfying prong two even if an institution eliminates a team for 
the underrepresented sex.207  Further, it is unclear how many opportunities 
must be added within what period of time in order to demonstrate a history 
and continuing practice of program expansion.208 
Under this less than lucid compliance regime, it is not outside the realm of 
reasonableness for an institution to not be fully aware of its compliance status 
regarding effective accommodation.  As such, the imposition of a notice 
 
participation to within 5% of female undergraduate enrollment within five years.  See Robert C. 
Farrell, Title IX or College Football?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 993, 1041–42 (1995). 
203. Both Dr. Donna Lopiano and Dr. Christine Grants, nationally and internationally recognized 
experts in Title IX, have testified that “substantial proportionality” is reached if the gap between the 
percentage of female enrollment and the percentage of female participation opportunities is less than 
the size of a female sports team that could be added.  Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887, at *13. 
204. Id. at *13 n.17 (“However, the court has some misgivings about the practical application of 
such a test, particularly in combination with plaintiffs’ concurrent advancement of the ‘team of one’ 
theory.  Under plaintiff’s combined theories, to the extent an institution has not added a team where 
individual competition is possible, such as swimming, indoor track & field, outdoor track & field, 
cross-country, fencing, or wrestling, that institution would not be ‘substantially’ proportionate if the 
participation gap was equal to one student who was interested in participating in such a sport.”). 
205. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 42.   
206. 1996 Clarification, supra note 56 (setting forth four examples intended to illustrate the 
principles underlying Prong Two). 
207. Id.   
208. Id. (“There are no fixed intervals of time within which an institution must have added 
participation opportunities.”); Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887, at *14–15 (recounting the testimony 
of Dr. Grant, the defendants’ expert, that an institution must expand every two to three years to rely 
on prong two and that an institution should be given a “credit” for adding a number of teams at once). 
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requirement for an alleged ineffective accommodation violation would 
encourage institutions to undertake a robust inquiry into their compliance plan 
in order to avoid potentially expansive monetary liability. 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit’s focus on intent is misplaced under the 
statutory and regulatory framework applicable to ineffective accommodation 
claims.  Intentional conduct in this context is different from intentional 
conduct in sexual harassment or retaliation claims.  In those cases, the focus is 
on an individual actor who makes a knowing and voluntary decision to engage 
in discriminatory conduct that violates Title IX.209  In effective 
accommodation, the decision at issue is one made by an educational 
institution, and in most circumstances, a decision not made by one individual 
unilaterally.210  Further, given that these are challenges to an institution’s 
athletic program, in most cases, the violation likely does not arise from one 
decision, but rather a series of decisions that impact numerous institutional 
policies, interests, and goals.211  Therefore, what the offending conduct is, 
who engaged in the offending conduct, and whether that person intended to 
engage in such conduct is a much more amorphous inquiry in a programmatic 
challenge than it is in a challenge arising out of a clearly identifiable actor’s 
discrete acts.212  
Moreover, the expansive conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit runs 
directly counter to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gebser.  Under the 
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, notice and an opportunity to cure would never 
 
209. See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277 (whether a school district can be held liable for the 
independent misconduct of a teacher); Davis, 526 U.S. at 639 (whether a school district can be held 
liable for the misconduct of other students); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171 (whether a school district can be 
held liable for its retaliatory conduct against a person who complains of sex discrimination).   
210. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968 (“Institutions, not individual actors, decide how to allocate 
resources between male and female athletic teams.”). 
211. Id. (“Decisions to create or eliminate teams or to add or decrease roster slots for male or 
female athletes are official decisions, not practices by individual students or staff.”). 
212. Critics of the imposition of notice argue that “[b]ecause schools create sex-segregated teams 
at the outset, they make a gender-conscious allocation of opportunities in the first instance.”  Samuels 
& Galles, supra note 6, at 26.  Theoretically, a school’s yearly funding decisions could constitute 
affirmative discriminatory conduct by the institution.  However, this characterization ignores the 
practical difficulties identifying and correcting gender inequities.  For example, the number of 
available athletes may fluctuate based upon incoming or graduating talent; the need for more female 
athletic opportunities may significantly increase due to a significant increase in the female 
undergraduate population; or the addition of a new varsity sport for women may take time to 
implement.  See Epstein, supra note 16 (noting the impediments to Title IX compliance “now that 
women constitute over 57 percent of all college students” because the number of spots on women’s 
teams does not increase with enrollment just as the number of spots on men’s teams does not decrease 
with diminishing enrollment).  Accordingly, while such circumstances would not excuse a Title IX 
violation, they do render problematic a clear identification of official intent for purposes of claims for 
money damages.   
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be required in ineffective accommodation cases because “[a]thletic programs 
that fail effectively to accommodate students of both sexes thus represent 
‘official policy of the recipient entity’ and so are not covered by Gebser’s 
notice requirement.”213  However, the Gebser Court expressly recognized that 
the administrative enforcement mechanism was designed for a recipient that 
“was unaware of discrimination in its program[].”214  Because the express 
enforcement scheme, which includes notice and an opportunity to cure, was 
purposefully aimed at remedying programmatic challenges, it is inconsistent 
with the statutory and regulatory scheme to wholly exclude private challenges 
to an institution’s program from a notice requirement.  Further, the Gebser 
Court also noted that imposing a notice requirement in private suits served the 
central purpose of the notice requirement in the agency enforcement scheme, 
namely, “to avoid diverting education funding from beneficial uses where a 
recipient was unaware of discrimination in its programs and is willing to 
institute prompt corrective measures.”215  The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
wholly ignores this aim. 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that an institution could not be 
legitimately unaware of the unequal provision of athletic opportunities in its 
athletic program is belied by the flexible nature of Title IX compliance.216  
Indeed, Mansourian demonstrates that the question of compliance is not so 
easily answered.  In Mansourian, two Title IX experts, both of whom were 
involved in the evolution of Title IX and its regulations and both of whom had 
previously testified only on behalf of the underrepresented sex in Title IX 
cases, disagreed about whether the university had sufficiently complied with 
prong two of the three-part test.217  Based upon the same history and the same 
official reports, the experts reached two different conclusions regarding 
whether the university had a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion.218  Accordingly, because of the flexible standards relating to Title 
IX compliance, as well as the ambiguity surrounding those already flexible 
standards, it is even more important that a university official with authority to 
address the complaint has notice of the specific basis for the claim and an 
 
213. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 968; see also Heckman, supra note 55, at 232 (“With traditional 
Title IX athletics claims of sex discrimination, it is submitted that any prerequisite notice provision 
should, if required, be deemed satisfied as therein the actions of the athletic department—as carried 
out by the athletic directors or coaches—represent the official policy of that educational institution.”). 
214. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). 
215. Id. at 289. 
216. Moreover, the Gebser Court expressly held that “failure to comply with the regulations does 
not establish the requisite actual notice and deliberate indifference.”  Id. at 291–92.  
217. Mansourian, 2011 WL 3364887, at *12–15. 
218. Id. 
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opportunity to respond.219 
B.  Notice and an Opportunity to Cure is Sound Policy 
Beyond being supported by cannons of statutory interpretation and by 
judicial precedent, notice and an opportunity to cure in claims for money 
damages based on ineffective accommodation claims is sound policy that 
furthers the goals and considerations underlying Title IX.   
Notice and an opportunity to cure in claims for money damages furthers 
the antidiscrimination goals of Title IX while also avoiding the diversion of 
educational funds away from beneficial uses.  The threat of potentially 
expansive financial hardship as a result of failure to respond to a complaint of 
ineffective accommodation is likely a sufficient incentive for a funding 
recipient to take a close look at its athletic program and take voluntary action 
to bring itself into compliance.  If an institution voluntarily complies, it 
ensures that educational funds are actually being used to provide athletic 
opportunities for the underrepresented gender, not to fund damages claims by 
students or former students who may not have the skill to compete at a varsity 
level or who may have already graduated from the institution.  This also serves 
Title IX’s focus on protection as opposed to compensation. 
Further, given the expansive nature of potential Title IX liability, it is 
important that an educational institution has notice of the specific violation at 
the base of the complaint.  As noted supra, the question of what constitutes 
ineffective accommodation itself is not a clear-cut inquiry.  Moreover, while 
ineffective accommodation claims constitute one category of Title IX 
violations, there are a number of different potential types of programmatic 
challenges arising out of alleged unequal treatment.  In order for an institution 
to have a reasonable opportunity to voluntarily remediate an actual violation, it 
needs to be on notice of the specific violation at issue.  For example, in 
Mansourian, the plaintiffs had never advised the university that they were 
claiming violations based upon alleged ineffective accommodation violations 
prior to bringing suit.220  Rather, they had filed complaints about the 
 
219. See Grandson, 272 F.3d at 576.   
These are flexible standards, and Gebser emphasized that money damages should not be 
awarded except for knowing violations.  When an individual plaintiff such as Grandson 
claims money damages from a specific Title IX violation . . . Gebser requires prior notice 
to a university official with authority to address the complaint and a response 
demonstrating deliberate indifference to the alleged violation.”   
Id. 
220. Indeed, the district court noted that it was not clear until oral argument on the defendants’ 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, almost four years after the case was filed, that the plaintiffs 
YAP (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  3:38 PM 
550 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
elimination of wrestling opportunities for women on the men’s varsity 
wrestling team.221  It was not until four years into the litigation that it became 
clear that the plaintiffs were launching a challenge against the number of 
female opportunities in the entire athletic program, not just alleged inequities 
in the wrestling program.222  However, despite this belated clarification to 
both the university and the court,223 under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the 
plaintiffs were entitled to press their broad, systemic claims for money 
damages without any opportunity for the university to enter into a voluntary 
compliance plan.224  Given that the university subsequently entered into a 
class settlement for expansive injunctive relief that would eventually bring the 
university into compliance under prong one,225 the litigation is an example of 
the unnecessary expenditure of sparse funds both with respect to the cost of 
litigation itself as well as any potential money damages. 
Conversely, the facts of Grandson exemplify how the system is supposed 
to work, honoring the importance of ensuring equal opportunities in athletics 
in addition to the fiscal constraints of most universities.  In Grandson, after a 
complaint was filed with OCR, the university entered into a voluntary 
agreement to increase athletic opportunities for women.  In approximately 
three years, the university had fully implemented all provisions of the 
agreement.  Accordingly, the goals of Title IX were served without imposing 
additional monetary obligations on the university in the form of money 
damages.  As such, from both a legal and policy perspective, the Eighth 
Circuit appropriately upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for money 
damages based upon the failure to give the university notice and an 
opportunity to cure.   
Moreover, notice and an opportunity to cure as a prerequisite to suits for 
money damages would increase public confidence in the implementation of 
Title IX.  In times of tight budget conditions, where athletic programs are 
already strained to continue providing existing athletic opportunities as well as 
 
were filing an ineffective accommodation claim under Title IX.  Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents, 617 
F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
221. Id. at 1019 n.7 (noting that the plaintiffs’ complaints to the defendants and OCR did not set 
forth an ineffective accommodation claim with respect to either the university’s wrestling program 
specifically or its athletic program generally, but rather alleged unequal treatment of female 
wrestlers). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Mansourian, 602 F.3d  at 966–68. 
225. Brust v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 07-1488 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009); Title IX 
Settlement Leads to Stricter 1.5 % Compliance Standard, UNIV. OF HA., MANOA, OFFICE OF THE C.-
INSTITUTIONAL RES. (June 22, 2009), available at http://ovcaa-iro.org/support_bulletin/2009/2009-
1.pdf.  
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to add more opportunities for female students,226 it is not hard to assume that a 
monetary windfall to female students, including those who have already 
graduated from the offending institution, would not be favorably received by 
the general public.  While everyone would prefer that educational institutions 
achieve the equality mandated by Title IX by increasing opportunities for 
female student-athletes to match those long-enjoyed by male student-athletes, 
schools with financial constraints cannot always do this.227  Even when the 
athletic budget pie gets smaller, both male and female athletes still deserve and 
are legally entitled to an equal slice.228  However, it serves neither Title IX’s 
policies nor the interests of any student-athlete when that pie is further 
diminished by money damages for a violation that an institution is willing to 
correct. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is beyond dispute that the opportunity to participate in collegiate 
athletics brings with it unparalleled experiences that educate and serve a 
student-athlete long after graduation.  Title IX legislatively mandates the 
sound policy that men and women should be given equal opportunities to 
participate in such experiences.  Litigation brought under Title IX can help 
ensure that educational institutions are honoring their agreements to provide 
such equal opportunities, particularly where the remedy sought is declaratory 
or injunctive in nature.229 
 
226. When the original implementing regulations were before Congress, Representative Patsy 
Mink acknowledged the tension between men’s major and minor sports and women’s sports, 
particularly during times of tight institutional and athletic budgets.  However, she concluded that such 
tension did not justify the continued denial of equal opportunities and benefits to female student-
athletes.  Samuels & Galles, supra note 6, at 22 (citing Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Post-Secondary Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. 166 
(1975) (statement of Rep. Mink)).  However, there was no mention of the balance between resources 
devoted to implementing programmatic change and those diverted to money damages at these 
congressional hearings. 
227. See Epstein, supra note 16 (“In hard times, budget dollars are still scarcer, so the pressure to 
cut men’s teams becomes even greater.  That pressure hits minor sports harder because of the large 
number of spots that colleges have to reserve for football.”); Starace, supra note 7; Susan M. Shook, 
Note, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990’s: Nonrevenue Men’s Teams 
Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L. J. 773, 793–96 (1996); see also Samuels 
& Galles, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that Title IX does not dictate an institution’s funding choices and 
“is not the cause of these schools’ decision-making”). 
228. See Title IX and Men’s “Minor” Sports: A False Conflict, supra note 11, at 5 (“Title IX 
simply ensures that it can no longer be the women who suffer cuts, second-class treatment, and the 
brunt of limited resources.”); Samuels & Galles, supra note 6, at 31 (“[Title IX] merely requires that 
[institutions] equitably allocate the opportunities and resources that they have.”). 
229. The author again notes that requiring notice and an opportunity to cure in suits for 
injunctive relief are not supported by the same arguments that apply to imposing such a requirement 
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However, requiring notice and an opportunity to cure in claims for money 
damages is neither a barrier nor an impediment230 to implementation of the 
policies advanced by Title IX.  It is a means of ensuring that valuable 
resources are directed at remedying inequities in the provision of athletic 
opportunities.  Where an institution knowingly fails to correct violations after 
being alerted of them, a plaintiff may pursue any and all remedies, including 
money damages.  But, to the extent that an institution is willing to voluntarily 
cure its own violations, it should be given the opportunity to do so, and thus 
provide as many opportunities as possible.  In a choice between institutional 
compliance and post-harm compensation, compliance should be the paramount 
interest. 
 
 
in suits for money damages. 
230. Heckman, supra note 55, at 232 (“The thirty-year history of individuals seeking redress for 
claims of Title IX sex discrimination within athletic departments is one replete with legal minefields 
placed along the way . . . . [W]hether the judiciary will require a condition precedent notice 
requirement in order to pursue a regular Title IX athletics case just represents another uphill climb in 
the long race to achieve gender equity in the nation’s schools.”). 
